More concretely, the author focuses on the period between the passing of the lex Sempronia de provinciis in 123 and the lex Pompeia de provinciis ordinandis of 52, which represented a watershed in the workings of Roman administration by separating the tenure of a magistracy from provincial command. Paradoxically, the defining features of Sulla’s new constitutional arrangement were buried by two of his foremost associates as they first trampled two critical Cornelian laws in order to seize a joint consulship and next passed legislation restoring the powers of the tribunes of the plebs and altering the balance of power in the court juries.ĭavid Rafferty (University of Adelaide) makes in this book a major contribution to a better understanding of the institutional procedures involved in allocating provinces in the Late Republic. Interestingly, it was Crassus who defused this dangerous stalemate by making the decisive first move towards formal reconciliation, albeit in the face of massive public pressure. Although they subsequently honoured their popular commitments as consuls, that neither Pompeius nor Crassus chose to disband their armies until sometime late in their tenure suggests that their entente was anything but cordial. Consequently, the Conscript Fathers had little choice but to grant Pompeius as well as Crassus the required dispensations from the Cornelian Law.
As both men ran on a strong popularis platform, the Senate now found itself between hammer and anvil. Crassus, for his part, felt he could not fall behind, and entered into an unlikely if formidable alliance with his political rival. In order to secure these top prizes, he brazenly refused to disband his army, instead using it as leverage, just as he had already done in 81 and 77. Pompeius Magnus, back from Spain, decided he would settle for nothing less than another public triumph and the consulship itself. At some point in the summer or early autumn of 71, the equestrian proconsul Cn. By means of this enormous army as well as his relentless efforts and strict discipline, he managed to put an end to this protracted and inglorious war in the span of six months. Having raised no less than six legions, personally advancing the funds required, he also took command of the two consular legions in the field. Immediately following his election, Crassus began preparing, probably receiving a grant of delegated praetorium imperium to bridge the interval between election and assumption of office.
Licinius Crassus announced that he would run for praetor, declaring he was prepared to accept the command against Spartacus. 73) triggered a dearth of candidates for the consular and praetorian elections for 71. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and then the proconsul C.
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Late in 72 BCE, Spartacus’ stunning series of victories over the consuls L. As Rafferty argues, this made the provincial allocations system one of the central causes of Rome's growing political dysfunction in the late Republic. A new picture emerges, of structural conflicts revolving around the relationship between consuls and tribunes.
And at every stage, the institutions shaped the politics. Since provincial questions were of central importance to the senatorial class, they were the source of many of the political contests which dominate our source record. An appendix recording the Senate's year-by-year decisions supports this and allows us to see trends in the data. Different chapters address the system of allotment (sortitio), the authorisation of troops and funds (ornatio), and the ritual prerequisites for departure, all based solidly on the surviving evidence. It considers the actual process of allocations, from the Senate's decree of consular and praetorian provinces through to the transfer of command on the ground. This study is the first comprehensive treatment of the provincial allocations system in the late Roman Republic, between the provincial law carried by Gaius Gracchus in 123 BCE and that carried by Pompeius Magnus in 52 BCE.
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